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Abstract: 
This paper explores the dynamics underlying integration of the 
international grain markets of the nineteenth century. It 
demonstrates that ‘deep’ integration implied changes to market 
structures, firm strategies and the commodity being marketed. 
Coordination within grain markets occurred at multiple levels 
(markets, firms, committees, etc.) and involved various firm 
strategies (integration, co-specialisation, voluntary consensus, etc.). 
There was a greater degree of standardisation as centralised 
grading systems were developed by commodity exchanges in the 
US and UK. Greater standardization made the commodity fungible 
and tradable through an institutional rather than a technical 
process. The global value chain that emerged during this period 
developed governance structures and institutions to coordinate the 
enormous expansion in scope as well as scale of trade. Many of 
these structures and institutions continue to coordinate the 
international markets in the twenty-first century. The paper uses the 
global commodity value chain (GCC) approach to develop these 
arguments and focuses on the international wheat trade of the 
nineteenth century - centred on UK as the major importer. This 
research stresses that governance and institutions that enable 
global disintegration (of the value chain) crucially drives and informs 
our understanding of market integration – they are two sides of the 
same historical coin.    
 
 
The dominant historical view considers price convergence to be 
irrefutable evidence of globalisation and international market integration.1 
                                                     
∗ This manuscript is work-in-progress. No part of it should be quoted or circulated 
without the express permission of the author. Most of the research for this paper was 
undertaken during the Economic History Society’s Postan Fellowship, 2008-09. The 
author wishes to thank the Society and the Institute for Historical Research for financial 
assistance and the Economic History Department, London School of Economics for 
providing a ‘home’ during the Fellowship. 
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This view has informed most recent studies of market integration in the 
nineteenth century providing stylised facts about international markets 
during that episode of globalisation.2 Most economic historians accept 
that price spreads between transatlantic markets declined as real 
commodity prices converged in accordance with the law of one price 
(LOOP). The reasons for this convergence are believed to be increases in 
market efficiency in addition to the decline in trade and transport costs.  
 North (1958), and later Harley (1988), had stressed the role of 
declining transportation and freight costs on the price convergence of 
commodities, particularly wheat, during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Recent literature has provided new estimates of price 
convergence and expanded the role for other transaction and trade cost 
reductions in reducing price spreads.3 Economic historians believe that 
policy and institutional factors had a significant impact on market 
integration, as much as, if not more, than technological factors.4 Such 
facts have reignited the debate regarding the proximate causes for 
market integration, more robust estimations of the extent and efficiency of 
                                                                                                                                                           
1 Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The 
Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1999). Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "When Did Globalisation Begin?," 
European Review of Economic History 6, no. 01 (2002). 
2 David S. Jacks, "What Drove 19th Century Commodity Market Integration?," 
Explorations in Economic History 43, no. 3 (2006). David S. Jacks, Christopher M. 
Meissner, and Dennis Novy, "Trade Costs in the First Wave of Globalization," 
Explorations in Economic History 47, no. 2 (2010). Karl Gunnar Persson, "Mind the 
Gap! Transport Costs and Price Convergence in the Nineteenth Century Atlantic 
Economy," European Review of Economic History 8, no. 02 (2004). Mette Ejrnæs, Karl 
Gunnar Persson, and Søren Rich, "Feeding the British: Convergence and Market 
Efficiency in the Nineteenth-Century Grain Trade," The Economic History Review 61, 
no. s1 (2008). etc. 
3 Persson, "Price Convergence." 
4 Jacks, "Market Integration." Jan Tore Klovland, "Commodity Market Integration 1850-
1913: Evidence from Britain and Germany," European Review of Economic History 9, 
no. 02 (2005). 
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integration, and the timing and speed of market adjustment.5 These 
issues remain engaging to economic historians. 
The price convergence – trade cost literature, however, remains 
silent on some important issues surrounding market integration. This 
literature assumes that markets (and firms) internalised the externalities 
that drove the expansion in trade volumes, i.e. increase in the scale of 
trade. Such externalities include technological changes (cost of 
transportation and distribution), economic (transaction costs and 
coordination), political (trade restrictions, stable monetary regime), etc. 
Why and how were markets (and firms) able to capture these 
externalities? Why and how were markets (and firms) able to capture 
these externalities? Did it depend upon organisational, structural or 
institutional changes to the market(s)? Did firms integrate, form new 
networks, centralise activities, etc.? How crucial was the role of 
institutions such as commodity exchanges and trade associations? These 
are important questions if we are to understand integration as a historical 
process. 
Further, modelling techniques used in the price-convergence 
literature control for product quality in order to establish price 
convergence. In other words, an assumption of product homogeneity or 
fungibility is made in most price convergence studies.6 The models 
assumes that fungibility is a technical attribute and that it is achieved 
costlessly. Importantly, the models mask the increase in product 
heterogeneity that was the consequence of expanding international trade. 
For a staple commodity such as wheat, the number of varieties 
(distinguished both by quality and biological variety) available in British 
                                                     
5 Ejrnæs, Persson, and Rich, "Convergence & Efficiency." Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, 
"Trade Costs." 
6 This is a common assumption in neo-classical models. Alfred Marshall had argued 
that commodities such as wheat, cotton and iron could be traded over large distances 
because they could be easily and exactly described; Alfred Marshall, Principles of 
Economics, 2nd Edition ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1891). Book V Ch1 p. 285. 
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markets increased from 16 to 65 between c1850 and c1880. Market 
integration entailed an expansion of the scope of commodity trade as well 
as scale of international trade.  
This paper provides new insights on such issues by taking a 
different approach and asking different questions. It explores the 
dynamics underlying market integration by studying the historical 
processes and the structural changes experienced by markets as they 
became increasingly more integrated. How did the grain markets alter - 
structurally and organisationally - to accommodate the increased scale as 
well as scope of trade? Did the structural and organisational change 
determine the speed with which markets integrated in the nineteenth 
century? How did the markets coordinate the increasingly complex trade 
in an increasingly complex commodity? Such questions are answered by 
understanding the ‘deep’ integration of international grain markets in the 
nineteenth century. 
‘Deep’ integration in this paper refers to a greater, more explicit and 
deeper level of coordination and control. It is characterised by the 
elimination of product differences through the harmonisation of practices 
as well as by standardisation of products, emergence of governance 
structures and market institutions, evidence of multiple levels of 
coordination, and a global dependence on value-added activities. This 
approach moves away from the exclusively market-oriented or firm-
oriented view of integration. It incorporates explanations for historical 
changes to the commodity, in addition to the market structure and firm 
strategies and offers a broader perspective on the historical processes. 
Correspondingly, the paper explores the integration process 
through the study of global commodity chains and claims that global 
value chains – as opposed to global trading networks –emerged in the 
grain markets in the late nineteenth century. Global commodity chain 
(GCC) analysis presents powerful insights on three of the most important 
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issues driving market integration: institutional changes that lowered 
transaction and information costs that had acted as barriers along 
international markets; structural changes within the markets that enabled 
economic groups to internalise the externalities generated during the ‘first 
wave of globalisation’; the speed of institutional and structural changes 
which in turn affected the speed of integration. In this paper, the 
commodity chain studied is the international wheat-flour chain of the 
nineteenth century centred around UK as the major consumption centre. 
The GCC analysis is distinct from the world systems view proposed 
by Immanual Wallerstien and Andre Gunder Frank and the strong a priori 
assumptions regarding systematic long term trade between the ‘core’ and 
the ‘periphery.’ Rather, the analytical framework developed for this paper, 
discussed in detail in the following section, is based upon the approaches 
developed by Gereffi (1994), and Gibbon (2001).7 The main advantage of 
the GCC approach is that it focuses on the changing structural and 
institutional relationships, traces the economic behaviour of 
heterogeneous groups linked by the chain (producers, intermediaries, 
and consumers), and analyses the diverse ways in which economic 
activity is coordinated along the chain.  
This paper presents four arguments in relation to integrating grain 
markets of the nineteenth century. Coordination in international wheat 
markets occurred at multiple levels (markets, firms, committees, etc.) and 
in several different ways (integration, co-specialisation, voluntary 
consensus, regulation, etc.). Markets had to standardise various ways of 
measuring and grading an increasingly complex commodity. As a result, 
decentralised and de facto standards that had historically emerged in 
                                                     
7 Other historians have used a similar approach to commodity chains, which is different 
from the World Systems view; see contributions in Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and 
Zephyr Frank, eds., From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and 
the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000 (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2006). 
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domestic markets were replaced by centralised quality grades developed 
by commodity exchanges. These grades, which emerged independently 
in the US and UK formed the basis of the international trade by the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Fungibility of this commodity was 
dependent upon such standardisation and grading and was institutionally 
created, rather than technically derived. This institutional process was 
greatly influenced by the coordination forms and structures, and was the 
result of explicit negotiation and consensus. The international value chain 
that emerged during this time developed various governance structures 
and institutions, which helped to coordinate activity along the chain. They 
also helped to develop the standards and grades that underscored the 
international expansion, both in terms of scale and scope. Thus, for 
example, institutions transformed quality testing into quality assurance by 
standardisation that enabled the markets to manage the increasing 
heterogeneity of an internationally traded commodity. The paper claims 
that these historical changes, which occurred during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, enabled ‘deep’ integration to develop between 
international grain markets. 
The major implications of the arguments made in the paper are 
twofold. First, economic historians need to be cautious that over the long 
term commodities change or alter, both in an institutional as well as a 
physical/technical sense. Fungibility, tradability and homogeneity of 
commodities are social constructs and not inherently physical qualities. 
Commodities were made easily describable so that they could become 
fungible and tradable; they were not universally or easily describable to 
begin with.8 Historical surveys over the long periods need to be cognizant 
of dynamic markets, firms and commodities. Second, international 
integration in the nineteenth century was an enduring process, with 
implications beyond the historical period during which prices converged. 
                                                     
8 Marshall, Principles. Book V Ch 1. 
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The seeds of the integrated international markets for many commodities, 
such as wheat and other grains, in the twentieth century lay in the forms, 
structures, and institutions that emerged during late nineteenth century. 
The effects of integration endured beyond the nineteenth century 
because productive and economic activity could be effectively 
disintegrated globally.9 
The main arguments are developed in the rest of the paper in the 
following manner. Section I explains the overall methodological approach 
and develops the analytical framework for the global chain analysis. 
Section II describes the changing structure of the trade during the 
nineteenth century in terms of market structures and the business groups 
that formed the value chain. It sets the basis for understanding why 
coordination and standardisation were crucial issues along this 
commodity chain. Section III explores how the trade developed various 
different ways to grade this complex commodity, why this was a 
prolonged process, and how eventually these grades became acceptable 
standards internationally. Section IV describes how the non-trading firms 
within this chain adopted the grades, while developing their own methods 
of coordination and standardisation. Section V examines the evidence 
and develops the main arguments. The concluding section offers remarks 
on the broader implication of the ‘deep’ integration analysis.  
 
 
I 
The overall methodological approach in the paper is to analyse 
integration as a long-term historical process rather than as shifts in 
equilibria. Analytically, this permits the observation of changes within 
markets and the dynamics along the networks connecting the markets, in 
                                                     
9 Robert C Feenstra, "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998). 
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addition to observing convergence between the markets. ‘Deep’ 
integration can be established by investigating product standardisation, 
and the development of institutions and governance structures. The 
criteria for deep integration is thus greater coordination and control. 
This important link between coordination and integration was 
stressed by Lawrence (1996) when he used the term ‘deep integration’ to 
mean the elimination of differences in national production and product 
standards, credible and stable governance mechanisms, secure access 
to large foreign markets and removal of barriers to regional production 
systems and service investment.10 Birdsall and Lawrence (1999) argue 
that deeper integration (among nations) brings ‘integration not only in 
production of goods and services but also in standards and other 
domestic policies’ (p. 128). International economists have stressed the 
problem of coordination in cross-border trade, particularly as exchanges 
in international markets have historically been subject to discontinuities in 
political and legal systems. Incomplete international contracts have had to 
rely upon international norms and customs for coordination.11 The 
problem of coordination and control also becomes significant when we 
consider that trade integration has historically been accompanied by 
disintegration of production and consumption centres.12 To understand 
trade integration, we also need to understand the disintegration of 
productive and consumption activities. 
Global commodity chain (GCC) analysis offers a powerful way to 
analyse deep market integration, within this broader framework. Recent 
literature on commodity chains distinguishes between different types of 
                                                     
10 Lawrence distinguishes ‘deep’ from ‘shallow’ integration, the latter of which, he 
argues, involves only the removal of border barriers to permit trade (p. 17). 
11 Dani Rodrik, "How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?," The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14, no. 1 (2000). Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial 
Organization (Cambridge, US: MIT Press, 1988). and Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts and 
Financial Structure (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995). for problems of incomplete 
contracts. 
12 Feenstra, "Trade Integration." 
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coordination: producer-driven as distinct from buyer-driven, etc.13 The 
analytical focus here is to unearth the mechanism of coordination – ‘who 
does what’ – with an objective of identifying the locus of control. The 
method does not assume that control depends upon the concentration of 
the ownership of productive resources. In this regard, the coordination 
approach distances this literature from its roots in the ‘dependency theory’ 
and world systems view where control of global trade was often equated 
with international control of productive facilities. The major insight from 
this literature is that industrial and commercial capital promoted global 
integration (as distinct from global trade) without direct ownership by 
establishing distinct forms of coordination. 
 Gibbon (2001) identified a form of coordination seen particularly 
within chains of ‘traditional’ primary commodities. This form of 
coordination, which he termed ‘trader-driven’, depended upon the 
‘shifting, highly filamented, upstream networks of trade and finance 
combined with more permanent downstream and horizontal networks (p. 
351).’ While such trader driven coordination has a special significance to 
the analysis of international grain markets, the broader issue is that this 
literature identifies a mechanism to analyse how global-scale production 
and distribution systems could operate without direct ownership of 
facilities.  
This coordination focussed analysis of international chains enables 
us to examine whether price-convergence coincided with the emergence 
of specific coordination forms within international grain markets of the 
nineteenth century. We are also able to evaluate whether these 
coordination forms enabled firms to internalise the trade and transaction 
                                                     
13 Gary Gereffi, "The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How Us 
Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks," in Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
1994). Gary Gereffi, "International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel 
Commodity Chain," Journal of International Economics 48, no. 1 (1999). 
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externalities without the need for vertical integration or direct ownership. 
Finally, we are able to investigate whether this coordination mechanism 
rendered an inherently heterogeneous commodity fungible by eliminating 
differences and standardising the commodity. 
GCC analysis is distinct from, but not necessarily at odds with, the 
diverse literature on business networks, and firm structures that promote 
trust and commitment in historic long distance trade.14 Ties of kinship, 
religion, ethnicity or other forms of associations and the organisational 
structures of firms that reduced transaction and information costs 
(including costs of commercial information, determining business 
strategies, monitoring competition, and appraising investment decisions) 
are forms of coordination that enabled firms to become competitive and 
profitable. However, the framework of chain analysis developed here is 
able to analyse changes to the commodity in addition to the business 
groups and the economic ties between them. This is important, as this 
paper shows that increasing coordination within the chain involved 
‘making’ the commodity fungible. The analysis in this paper will show that 
homogeneity and fungibility of primary commodities was not a technical 
attribute and historically was the product of negotiation and agreement.15 
The main elements of the GCC analysis can be described as 
follows. The paper focuses on the emergence of a global commodity 
                                                     
14 Avner Greif, "The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in 
Historical Institutional Analysis," European Review of Economic History 4, no. 03 
(2000). Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," The American Journal of 
Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973). James E. Rauch and Vitor Trindade, "Ethnic Chinese 
Networks in International Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics 84, no. 1 
(2002). Robin Pearson and David Richardson, "Business Networking in the Industrial 
Revolution," The Economic History Review 54, no. 4 (2001). Also Mark Casson and 
Howard Cox, "International Business Networks: Theory and History," Business and 
Economic History 22, no. 1 (1993). for a discussion of institutions and a transaction 
costs view of the firm.  
15 See James E. Rauch, "Networks Versus Markets in International Trade," Journal of 
International Economics 48, no. 1 (1999). who argues that homogenous commodities 
are distinguished by the fact that they have a reference price that helps to bring down 
search costs, unlike differentiated commodities that do not have a reference price and 
therefore depend upon network ties to match international buyers and sellers. 
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chain in the international wheat market of the nineteenth century, 
centering upon the UK as the main importing nation. The evidence for the 
formation of the GCC during the nineteenth century is evaluated on the 
basis of three criteria: a well-defined input-output structure that included 
various economic groups involved in the production, consumption and 
intermediation of the commodity, global dispersion of this structure and 
the various economic functions, and emergence of governance structures 
and institutions. This analysis is then used to evaluate the thesis of deep 
integration. 
Standardisation is analysed on the basis of the standards of wheat 
quality and the complex norms that emerged to measure the quality of 
wheat along this chain. The theoretical discussion on the problem of 
quality standards and measurement was set out previously by institutional 
economists.16 They argued that many (primary) commodities faced a 
fundamental exchange problem as delineating complete information 
about such products is inherently costly. Information, particularly about 
quality, is usually based upon multiple product attributes, creating the 
potential for information asymmetry – a classic principal-agent problem. 
Thus, the greater the number of measurable attributes, the costlier it is to 
measure the product ceteris paribus. 
Transaction costs depend upon the ease with which quality 
attributes can be measured. Thus, search attributes (e.g. color, weight, 
etc.) are easier to measure at the time of transaction, whereas experience 
attributes (e.g. taste, functionality, etc.) can usually be measured on an 
ex-post basis. Credence attributes (e.g. method of production) cannot be 
measured even on an ex-post basis and are based upon trust, reputation 
or third-party certification.17 Transaction costs also depend upon whether 
                                                     
16 Yoram Barzel, "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law 
and Economics 25, no. 1 (1982). Steven S Cheung, "The Contractual Nature of the 
Firm," Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 1 (1983). 
17 Tirole, Industrial Organization. 
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measurable attributes capture information about a product’s condition 
(freshness, moisture, color, size, etc.) or composition (chemistry, 
strength, purity, etc.) or functionality and performance (‘does it do what it 
says on the tin?’). It is less costly, prima facie, to measure the product’s 
condition rather than its composition or functionality.  
The challenge facing economic groups within a commodity chain 
was likely how to manage or minimize the measurement problem. 
Standardisation is an effective tool in overcoming information asymmetry 
by ensuring that measurements are made on the basis of common or 
summary criteria.18 Such common criteria could result from negotiation 
and compromise, and are not solely dependant upon economic or 
technical factors. Standardisation by third-party organizations, such as 
commodity exchanges also reduce potential costs by eliminating the need 
for repeated or duplicative measurements.19  
Thus, standardization – meaning elimination of product differences 
– is intimately tied to the governance structures, institutions and forms of 
coordination along the chain. In fact, standardization requires 
considerable coordination efforts between individuals, groups, 
organizations and institutions at various levels.20 This insight comes from 
‘convention theory’ which distinguishes between several modes of 
coordination. This theory suggests that humans create ‘equivalences’ 
between themselves in a variety of ways. These include both cognitive as 
well as organizational forms. Consequently, coordination forms depend 
upon the level of complexity involved in making things more general – or 
                                                     
18 Stefano Ponte and Peter Gibbon, "Quality Standards, Conventions and the 
Governance of Global Value Chains," Economy and Society 34, no. 1 (2005). Benoit 
Daviron, "Small Farm Production and the Standardization of Tropical Products," 
Journal of Agrarian Change 2, no. 2 (2002). 
19 Stephen Craig Pirrong, "The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing 
Institutions: The Successes and Failures of Commodity Exchanges," The Journal of 
Legal studies 24, no. 1 (1995). 
20 Aashish Velkar, "Markets, Standards and Transactions: Measurements in Nineteenth 
Century British Economy " (London School of Economics, 2009). Unpublished PhD 
Thesis. 
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standardised - across contexts.21 As complexity (of exchange) stretches 
from bi-lateral to multi-lateral, coordination stretches from being ex ante 
or de facto (between individuals) to ex post or explicit (by committees or 
associations). On this spectrum, market-coordination and firm-
coordination lie somewhere between the two extremes. Importantly, there 
need not be a single rule or set of rules coordinating economic activity or 
behaviour.22 This resonates with Gibbons’ conception of coordination 
modes in primary commodity chains, discussed previously, where 
filamented networks combine with permanent structures. 
The major archival sources consulted in preparing this paper 
include the records of the London Corn Trade Association (located at 
Guildhall Library, London, UK), reports of and evidence presented to 
various parliamentary select committee (pubished in the British 
Parliamentary Papers), and the UK Board of Trade Papers (located in 
London, UK). In addition, trade journals, such as Miller, provided 
facsimilies of letters by merchants and millers (which were treated as 
primary evidence) as well as technical and commercial reports (which 
were treated as secondary evidence). These journals, along with the 
Statistical Abstracts of the UK and other statistical information published 
in the Parliamentary Papers also provided valuable price and trade data. 
Published histories of the grain trade, merchants and business firms, as 
well as literature on millers and milling industry was invaluable in piecing 
together the structure of, and changes to, the international commodity 
chain. Evidence on the US commodity exchanges was primarily based 
upon published literature and histories, with the exception of select 
annual reports of the Chicago Board of Trade. 
                                                     
21 Laurent Thévenot, "Organized Complexity: Conventions of Coordination and the 
Composition of Economic Arrangements," European Journal of Social Theory 4, no. 4 
(2001): 406-407. 
22 John Wilkinson, "A New Paradigm for Economic Analysis?," Economy and Society 
26, no. 3 (1997): 323. 
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II 
The evidence for the emergence of a global value chain in the 
international wheat markets helps to unravel the profound changes to the 
input-output structure within the wheat markets. Market integration was 
accompanied by radical changes in the market composition and structure, 
the international sources of wheat and the major trade routes along which 
it flowed, the different economic groups involved in the market, and the 
degree of co-specialisation and integration of economic activity. 
Explaining these changes establishes the manner in which the 
externalities resulting from the economic, technological and institutional 
changes of the nineteenth century were internalised, i.e. whether through 
integration, co-specialisation, regulation or better governance structures. 
Finally, the changes to the commodity chains helps to shed light on an 
important historical question: why did Atlantic markets (e.g. UK-US) take 
almost a half century to mature from emerging international market 
following the repeal of the Corn Laws?23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Ejrnæs, Persson, and Rich, "Convergence & Efficiency," 3. 
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Figure 1: 
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Source: Data on domestic sales from PP 1889 Vol. LX p. 23; data on imports 
from PP 1886 Vol. LX p. 405. 
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Figure 2: 
 
Composition of Wheat Imports
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Source: Statistical Abstracts Nos. 37 & 38. 
 
 
The wheat-flour commodity chain is analysed along four changing 
dimensions: the input-output structure of the commodity chain, its spatial 
dispersion along international trade routes, the internal governance 
structures, and the changing institutional framework. Throughout the 
nineteenth-century the volume of grain being sold and consumed grew 
exponentially. Domestic wheat sales increased roughly fives times in 
quantity between 1815 and 1850. With the repeal of the Corn Laws, 
which had restricted the import of foreign corn between 1815 and 1846, 
imports of wheat increased nearly tenfold between 1830 and 1885 (figure 
1).24 This slowed the growth in domestic wheat sales, and by the 1860s, 
more wheat was imported than was being sold in the domestic markets. 
The commodity was imported from several sources, the main sources 
                                                     
24 See also Susan Fairlie, "The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production, 1829-76," 
The Economic History Review 22, no. 1 (1969). 
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being the US and Russia in the late nineteenth-century. However, wheat 
was also imported from Argentina, Australia, India and several other 
locations in Europe. In addition to wheat, these markets supplied the UK 
with other grain and cereals, such as barley, malt, rye, etc. The US 
imports became the single most important overseas source of grain for 
the UK in the last two decades of the nineteenth-century. On an average, 
imports of wheat from the US accounted for nearly half of the annual 
wheat import into the UK between 1875 and 1885 (figure 2). The impact 
on domestic wheat and flour prices of such imports concerned both the 
millers as well as the corn trade in general; both groups being equally 
concerned about profitability.25  
The proportion of British population consuming wheat (and 
wheaten bread) increased throughout the nineteenth-century compared 
to consumption of other cereals. Whereas in 1800 about two thirds of the 
population of Great Britain were estimated to have been consuming 
wheat, by 1900 wheat consumption had become nearly universal, while 
the consumption of oats and barley declined. In per capita terms, 
consumption of wheat is estimated to have increased from 5.1 bushels to 
5.5 bushels in the latter part of the nineteenth-century.26 These shifts 
were a result of several factors, such as the decreasing price differentials 
of the various cereals, the high cross-price-income elasticity of wheat, 
degree of urbanization, the emergence of professional bakers and millers, 
technological improvements in milling, changing eating habits, etc.  
The input-output structure of the commodity chain changed 
radically during the nineteenth-century. By the end of that century, the 
                                                     
25 PP 1886 Vol. XXI, First Report of Royal Commission on Depression of Trade and 
Industry, p 93, memo from Liverpool Corn Trade Association. 
26 E J T Collins, "Dietary Change and Cereal Consumption in Britain in the Nineteenth 
Century," Agricultural History Review 23 (1975): 114-115. Meanwhile, in the US, per 
capita wheat production doubled between 1850 and 1880 from 5 bushels to nearly 10 
bushels, even as per capita consumption remained steady at 4.5 bushels; Morton 
Rothstein, "Centralizing Firms and Spreading Markets: The World of International Grain 
Traders, 1846-1914," Business and Economic History 17 (1988)., p. 106 
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commodity chain involved a complex organizational structure, 
characterized by layers of interrelated firms and organized commodity 
markets. Traditionally, a large domestic market, such as London, was 
supplied by the home counties of Kent, Essex and Suffolk. In the mid-
eighteenth-century, a corn exchange was set up in Mark Lane in London, 
which signalled the beginnings of an organized or terminal market for 
wheat and other grains. Very few farmers sold directly at Mark Lane. 
Instead, the sale of wheat was controlled by a group of factors, known as 
‘hoymen’. They sold wheat and other grains on commission on behalf of 
the farmers. Wheat was mainly sold to the miller, while other corn was 
purchased by ‘a galaxy of corn dealers [and other middlemen], many of 
whom were engaged in “dealings” or speculative activities alongside their 
basic trades.’27 Private bargaining characterized the trades in such 
exchanges, with open or regulated market trades being insignificant or 
non-existent, at least in the early years. Wheat from the home counties 
that was not sent to London was sold to country millers, although it was 
not unusual for country millers to obtain wheat from London based 
factors.28 
 
                                                     
27 Dennis Baker, "The Marketing of Corn in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: 
North-East Kent," Agricultural History Review 18, no. 2 (1970): 136. 
28 C R Fay, "The London Corn Market at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," The 
American Economic Review 15, no. 1 (1925): 72-73. Baker, "Corn Marketing," 138. 
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Figure 3a 
Domestic (UK) Wheat-Grain Commodity Chain 
British Farmer 
Commission 
Factors
Grain 
Merchants 
Terminal and local Markets 
(e.g. Mark Lane in London) 
Millers Bakers
The mealman purchased and milled the grain - or got it milled from 
millers - and subsequently sold the flour directly to the bakers or on the 
open market.29 Sometime during the eighteenth-century, the millers 
integrated several related activities: corn buying, grinding, dealing in meal 
and flour, etc. They effectively subsumed the functions of the mealman, 
whereby they began ‘mealing’, or mixing flour. Some bakers had begun to 
integrate backwards combining the functions of the baker, miller and 
mealman. Nevertheless, we find the millers and bakers as distinct groups 
in the nineteenth-century, suggesting that not all bakers had integrated 
backwards.30  
                                                     
29 F. J. Fisher, "The Development of the London Food Market, 1540-1640," The 
Economic History Review 5, no. 2 (1935): 61. 
30 Baker, "Corn Marketing," 142-143. 
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By the end of the eighteenth-century, imported wheat began 
reaching British markets in large quantities, such as supplies of Irish corn 
sold in Liverpool. The importing merchant became an important member 
in this chain, although it was the factor that remained the main conduit for  
the buyers of wheat. As imports of wheat grew considerably after c1860 
(figure 1), dynamics within the exporting country became significant. 
Figure 3b 
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The claim in O'Rourke (1997) that the ‘invasion’ of cheap grain 
from the New World increased real wages in the UK, and also elsewhere 
in Europe in more or less an accepted fact about the international grain 
trade of the nineteenth century. This ‘invasion’ required grain (wheat) 
exporting nations – the US, Australia, Russia, Argentina, etc. – to 
substantially expand land under wheat cultivation. From the UK 
perspective, this expansion of productive capacity was accompanied by 
three vital shifts. First, the imported wheat was of ‘harder’ variety 
compared to the ‘softer’ varieties that were increasingly grown in the 
UK.31 Second, multinational merchants – who gradually transformed into 
multinational firms – dominated the intercontinential grain trade (e.g. Ralli 
Brothers). Several Anglo-Greek shipping firms that has depended upon 
historic, kinship ties were challanged by the newer multinationals who 
were integrating the various intermediary functions in the Atlantic trade.32 
In the US, ‘grain barons’ emerged who dominated various parts of the 
trade including milling, warehousing, and storage and transportation (e.g. 
Issac Friedlander, Washburns, Pillsburys, William Cargill, Frank Peavey, 
etc.).33 Third, exporting countries, particularly the US, developed 
dedicated institutions and organistions that coordinated the marketing, 
distribution, storage, and quality control along the commodity chain (e.g. 
Chicago Board of Trade, Board of Railroad and Warehouse 
Commissions, etc.). 
Broadly speaking, wheat sold by the farmer to the exporting 
merchant for reshipment to Britain would normally arrive in sacks at the 
importing port, which could be identified with the original seller. If grain 
                                                     
31 John R Walton, "Varietal Innovation and the Competitiveness of the British Cereals 
Sector, 1760-1930," Agricultural History Review 47, no. 1 (1999). 
32 Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to 
World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Rothstein, "Centralizing 
Firms ". 
33 Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (New York: The Viking Press, 1979). 
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was mixed it was done by the importing merchant at the port of import. 
The most important exception to this was North American corn, which 
was sold to the operators of the grain elevators. Here the grain would be 
mixed with other grain of similar quality, the farmer receiving the price 
according to the quality. The operators would sell this mixed grain, of 
‘standard’ quality either at the trade exchanges or to the exporting or 
commission merchants at the large primary markets, such as Milwaukee 
or Chicago.34  
The important fact here is that the commodity changed hands a 
number of times along the chain as it travelled from the producer to the 
consumer. Also, value addition to the commodity occurred in various 
forms and along the various stages in this chain: sorting and grading, 
mixing and storage, transport and distribution, milling and baking, etc. 
These activities gradually dispersed internationally as the chains 
lengthened along international routes. Thus, grain milled into flour in 
Britain was most likely to have been grown, sorted, graded, and mixed in 
transcontinental locations, such as the Americas, by the end of the 
nineteenth century (figures 3a & 3b). 
These facts highlight two important and related developments 
within the commodity chain. For the commodity to efficiently change 
hands a number of times and to go through the various stages of value 
addition along the chain, the commodity had to become fungible. 
Simultaneously, the exchanges between the buyer and the seller had to 
be well coordinated. Fungibility depended both upon the degree to which 
the product was standardised throughout the chain as well as the extent 
to which the producer’s identity was alienated from the produce.35 
Coordination implied, among other things, the reduction in search costs 
as well as the emergence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms. 
                                                     
34 Miller (London) April 5, 1880, p 99. 
35 Daviron, "Standardization," 163. 
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The confluence of both these developments determined the speed and 
extent to which the chains lengthened and dispersed internationally. Both 
fungibility and coordination required standardisation and the elimination of 
product differences across international routes. 
One of the key institutional innovations of the nineteenth century 
that aided these two developments was the emergence of the commodity 
exchanges in the US and UK. The exchanges began to standardise 
quality grades and commercial contract terms. Thus, they instituted new, 
or improved existing, governance structures along the chain. Few 
agricultural products could be standardized by simple and controllable 
processes by the end of the nineteenth-century. They were affected by 
several natural factors, and quality variations within the same variety or 
breed could occur in an unpredictable fashion.36 This problem of 
standardisation implied that most disputes involving the sale of 
commodities such as wheat involved the inability of trading parties to 
agree on the quality of the goods. Indeed, in the nineteenth century, it 
was ‘mostly the disputes over the condition and quality of goods sold that 
occupied the time of arbitrators.’37 Disputes only multiplied as the volume 
of transactions increased throughout the nineteenth century and ‘buyers 
[became] less disposed to leave themselves at the mercy of the 
shippers.’38 Consequently, radical changes were made in the way quality 
was assessed along internationalising commodity chains.  
Traditionally, it was in the interest of the mealman, who mixed 
different grades of wheat, to assess the quality of grain he bought, as 
there was often a substantial price differential between the best and 
                                                     
36 Wells A Sherman, "Standardizing Production - What Has Been Done and What Can 
Be Done," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 142 (1929): 
419. 
37 Robert B Ferguson, "The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the Legal 
System in Modern England," British Journal of Law and Society 7, no. 2 (1980): 145. 
38 C Chattaway, "Arbitration in the Foreign Corn Trade in London," The Economic 
Journal 17, no. 67 (1907): 428. 
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inferior quality wheats.39 When the millers integrated the functions of the 
mealman by the eighteenth-century, the mixing of different grain quality, 
and therefore the assessment of quality, was done by them. With the 
establishment of the organized markets, such as Mark Lane or other 
regional markets, the assessment of quality was done at these nodes. 
This coincided with the rise in the practice of selling by sample. The buyer 
and the seller would agree on a price upon inspection of the sample and 
the delivery by the seller would have to conform to the quality of the 
assessed sample.40  
From the mid-nineteenth-century onwards, commodity exchanges, 
such as the London Corn Trade Association (LCTA) or the Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBT), began to develop detailed mechanisms to measure and 
grade these complex goods. The exchanges were mainly concerned with 
grading imported wheats, not domestic ones: there is no evidence that 
either of these exchanges developed formal grades for the domestic 
trade. This is perhaps not surprising, as by the time these exchanges 
began developing formal grades c1880, the quantum of foreign imports 
was roughly eight times that of domestic sales (figure 1).41 After c1860, 
grain imported from North America, especially from the Midwest area of 
the US, was shipped according to distinct quality grades. The grain 
elevator operators in the US did the grading, particularly since grain from 
different producers was being mixed during storage and prior to 
transportation. 
                                                     
39 Christian Petersen, Bread and the British Economy, C1770-1870, ed. Andrew 
Jenkins (Aldershot, England: Solar Press, 1995), 158-159. PP 1805 Vol. III, Report of 
Select Committee on Import and Export of Corn,  p. 195, evidence of Peter Giles to the 
select committee stating that the price of good quality wheat could be double that of 
inferior quality. 
40 Baker, "Corn Marketing," 138. PP 1834 Vol. XLIX, Returns from corn inspectors p. 
259. 
41 In 1880, foreign wheat imports amounted to 55 million tons as opposed to 6.7 million 
tons reported in domestic returns; PP 1889 Vol. LX, Statistical Tables of Corn 
Averages, p. 423. PP 1886 Vol. LX, Report of Grain Imported into the UK, p. 405. 
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By the end of the nineteenth-century, guaranteeing quality of 
imported wheat traded in the British markets was based primarily upon 
the grades that the exchanges developed. Commodity exchanges initially 
found it difficult to fix numerical grading standards. Standardised contract 
terms enforced by these exchanges provided an alternative mechanism 
for dispute resolution or arbitration even when product attributes could not 
be graded absolutely or quantitatively. The commodity exchanges 
therefore emerged as quality assurance or guaranteeing institutions.  
Such standardisation by commodity exchanges can be understood 
on the basis of at least four arguments. First there is the reduction in the 
measurement cost argument. This view suggests that because primary 
commodities are effectively heterogeneous, absence of product 
standards or quality grades would have resulted in costly, repeated and 
duplicative examination by buyers and sellers.42 Another view is the 
transaction cost argument, which suggests that standardized contract 
terms helped to institutionalize arbitration mechanisms and helped the 
‘clearing house system’ within commodity exchanges.43 The third view is 
the internationalization of farms argument, which suggests that 
commodity exchanges were instrumental in developing quality grades on 
the basis of which futures trading could develop. A futures market could 
transfer the price risk to a specialized group of speculators (the broker-
merchants) linking local farms to the international markets.44 Finally, there 
is the creation of trust argument, which supports the view that third party 
or ‘official’ grades are better able to guarantee quality than individual 
                                                     
42 Pirrong, "Commodity Exchanges," 232-233. 
43 Ferguson, "Commercial Disputes," 144-145. Chattaway, "Arbitration," 428. R B 
Forrester, "Commodity Exchanges in England," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 155, no. 1 (1931): 201-203.. The ‘clearing house system’ 
that Forrester describes refers to the activities of passing shipping and other 
commercial documents between traders, settlement of contracts, clearing of 
differences, etc. all in relation to ‘string transactions’, p. 203. 
44 Daviron, "Standardization," 163. 
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inspection or certification.45 It is likely that a combination of factors 
influenced the emergence of commodity exchanges and the resultant 
standardisation. Nevertheless, studying the development of standards, 
such as quality grades, by commodity exchanges provides important 
clues regarding the manner and extent to which internal governance 
structures developed or altered along the commodity chain.  
There was a fundamental transition during the nineteenth century 
as far as quality standards were concerned. Measurement of quality 
transformed from a decentralised activity situated in regional or local 
markets into a centralised activity coordinated by the commodity 
exchanges. Further, the standards used to measure the quality of wheat 
were transformed from the de facto standards used within local or 
regional markets to voluntary consensus standards that were acceptable 
on an international basis. Finally, the role of quality standards itself 
transformed from measurement of quality to that of guaranteeing or 
assuring quality to the buyer. 
The following sections analyse why and how this transition 
occurred during the nineteenth century in the international wheat grain 
commodity chain, primarily from the perspective of the UK markets. Along 
the way, it will shed light on two important questions. What institutional 
changes were required before product differences were eliminated along 
this commodity chain? How did the standardisation and institutional 
change help in reducing transaction costs?  
 
 
III 
Wheat markets dealt with numerous varieties of the commodity, 
based not only upon botanical distinction but also the distinct 
                                                     
45 J C F Merrill, "Classification of Grain into Grades," Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 38, no. 2 (1911): 61. 
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characteristics of each botanical variety. Before 1840, few varieties apart 
from several descriptions of the Red Lammas type were available in 
domestic British markets. In the 1850s and 1860s, many more varieties 
began appearing in the farm sales notices, including Hertfordshire White, 
Golden Drop, Trump, Spalding, Suffolk, April, Taunton, Mexican, Dantzic, 
Malaga, White Scotch, etc. At least 16 different domestic wheat types 
were available for sale in English grain markets in the 1850s, each 
differing not only in gluten content – the chemical substance which 
determines the bread-making ability of wheat - but also in terms of yield 
(i.e. quantity of grain per acre).46 In addition to the domestic varieties, 
wheat imports greatly increased the total number of varieties available for 
sale in British markets. One source listed more than 25 domestic varieties 
(including distinct grain types as well as grains of different quality) and 
about 40 foreign ones available in 1884.47 Prices of over a dozen 
American and European varieties in London and Liverpool were regularly 
reported in addition to prices of wheat from Bombay, New Zealand, 
Australia, Chile, and French varieties such as Nantes, Bayonne and 
Lille.48 The internationalisation of the wheat markets, thus, not only 
increased the sources of the commodity and the trade routes along which 
it travelled, but dramatically increased the heterogeneity of the wheat 
available for purchase in British markets. 
Millers and bakers in Britain naturally responded to the 
internationalising wheat markets by using a ‘grist’ made of numerous 
wheat varieties. Mixing of different wheat varieties allowed the widest 
possible use of inferior grade of wheats, which by themselves would have 
been unsuitable for making baking flour, particularly in London and other 
larger towns. Mixing also eked out the supply of expensive best quality 
                                                     
46 Walton, "British Cereals," 45-48. 
47 William Jago and William C Jago, The Technology of Bread-Making (London: Kent & 
Co., 1911), 272-279. 
48 see Miller, various issues. 
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wheat, and enabled the miller to enhance his margin by mixing expensive 
and inexpensive wheats and still sell the mixed flour at a price higher than 
that of inferior quality flour.49  
A typical mixture recommended in the eighteenth-century included 
one part best quality wheat to one part second-best quality wheat to two 
parts inferior quality wheat.50 As the availability of foreign wheat 
increased, best quality imported wheat was mixed with lower quality 
domestic varieties.51 In conjunction with the abolition of the assize in 
1836, this greatly increased the choice of wheat available for the miller to 
mix in various proportions, vastly compounding the complexity of the 
mealing process.52 By the latter half of the nineteenth-century, millers 
required knowledge about the varieties available, its sources, and quality; 
the millers craft now required a great deal of experimentation and risk.  
At some stage during the nineteenth century, it became important 
to establish the quality of the grain, independent of its origin and its 
botanical characteristic; this was, however, easier said than done. 
Historically, buyers in domestic markets had developed their own 
individual criteria for evaluating the quality of produce and the degree to 
which it matched their requirements. Varieties were identified according to 
their geographical origin, as was common practice in several other 
commodity markets (e.g. cotton). However, quality according to this 
criterion varied considerably and was not always consistent. Samples of 
wheat sold in important markets such as London or Liverpool were 
submitted for inspection and the ‘natural weight’ of the grain (i.e. its 
                                                     
49 PP 1814-15 Vol. V, Report of Select Committee on Manufacture and Sale of Bread, 
p1353, evidence by E G Smith.  
50 Petersen, Bread, 159. Historically, wheat had been divided into ‘best’, ‘second’ and 
‘third’ quality categories according to some quality attributes for the purpose of setting 
the Assize of Bread, 12 Henry VII cited in PP 1814-15 Vol. V, p. 1344. 
51 PP 1834 Vol. VII; PP 1814-15 Vol. V, various testimonies. 
52 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, "The Assize of Bread," The Economic Journal 14, 
no. 54 (1904). James Davis, "Baking for the Common Good: A Reassessment of the 
Assize of Bread in Medieval England," Economic History Review 57, no. 3 (2004). 
 28
   
weight per cubic capacity or density), its colour, dryness, presence of 
impurities and other physical characteristics were important attributes on 
which quality was assessed. The extent to which tacit knowledge was 
used to assess quality was high as ‘the eye, nose and hand were 
necessary [in] judging the value of grain, and dealers could determine its 
[density] by “merely taking up and poising a small quantity of it in their 
hands”’.53 Grain quality was assessed on the basis of such attributes 
before the advent of centralised grading by commodity exchanges after 
c1860. Prime, medium, and inferior reds and whites existed alongside 
English, French, Chicago, Milwaukee and New Orleans varieties of grain 
and most millers had to make their selection of grain with ‘care and 
deliberation’.54  
The proliferation of the different types and qualities of wheat grain 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century further exacerbated the 
problem of quality measurements. The following extract from The Miller, 
c1875 is illustrative: 
 
‘In purchasing wheat and choosing the description necessary 
to secure a uniform brand of flour, millers must often feel the 
want of a reliable test to guide them. It requires a very long 
and constant experience to judge the quality of even those 
wheat appearing daily in our markets; but we are left with the 
most unpleasant uncertainty when new descriptions are 
introduced to our notice.’55 
 
                                                     
53 Stanley Dumbell, "The Sale of Corn in the Nineteenth Century," The Economic 
Journal 35, no. 137 (1925): 144. It is important to consider the difference between 
specific gravity and natural weight in this context. Specific gravity measurements 
usually refer to the density of individual wheat grains. However, as will become clear 
later in the chapter, due to the manner in which natural weight measurements were 
made, they included the ‘density’ of empty spaces (or air) in addition to the density of 
the individual grain. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Miller, Oct 4 1875, ‘The study of a method to meet the requirements of millers in the 
analysis of wheat and wheaten flour’, p 196-7. 
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The buyers naturally preferred to sort the commodity as finely as 
possible. The primary logic here is that there was little incentive for the 
seller (e.g. farmers, traders) to sort the commodity, into any more 
categories than was necessary, such as by variety, port of origin or the 
season (winter, spring, etc.). The buyers (millers), on the other hand, 
sought to sort the commodity into a greater number of categories on 
attributes that indicated the grain’s bread-making ability. Practically, grain 
with certain ‘undesirable’ attributes, e.g. high moisture content, high 
impurities, etc., could be corrected and re-sorted into higher grades. But, 
grain with undesirable compositional attributes (density, colour, texture) 
could not be corrected for.56  
These incentives shaped the commercial terms, buying practices, 
and quality measurements in wheat contracts, even before the nineteenth 
century. In domestic markets, selling wheat on the basis of its density had 
emerged as a common method of assessing the quality of produce. This 
method guaranteed that the contracted volume of grain, say one-bushel 
measure, would weigh a specified amount, say 60 lbs. If the actual weight 
was more or less than the guaranteed weight per volume, the contract 
price was adjusted proportionately.57 For example, a contract for wheat 
from c1830, guaranteeing delivery weight to be 18 stone per quarter, 
specified price and terms as 54s 6d ‘pay or be paid’ i.e. the farmer was to 
make a ‘proportionate allowance’ to the merchant in case the net weight 
on delivery was under 18 stone 4 lbs, and conversely the farmer was to 
receive an allowance from the merchant in case the net weight on 
delivery was found to exceed 18 stone 4 lbs.58 In another example from 
Sheffield, weight per load was mentioned by the seller as confirmation of 
quality and could vary from 12 stone 19 lbs to 13 stone 10 lbs according 
                                                     
56 For the theoretical arguments, see Barzel, "Measurement Cost," 29-32. 
57 The other methods of selling grain in domestic markets were on the basis of volume–
only or weight-only measures. PP 1834 Vol. VII. 
58 PP 1834 Vol. XLIX. p.259; 1 stone equals 14 lbs and 6.35 kgs. 
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to the quality of wheat. Also, wheat brought into this market from 
Gainsborough and Lynn was sold by the quarter weighing 504 lbs, 
whereas wheat from Hull was to be delivered at 480 lbs per quarter.59 In 
the market town of Lewes, if the wheat purchased did not weigh the 
quantity stated by the seller per cubic capacity, ‘a diminution in price 
agreed upon [was] made’ and when the grain exceeded the weight 
stated, ‘the price [was] advanced’.60 There are similar examples from 
other market towns such as Lincoln, Stamford, York, Leeds, Wakefield, 
Hull, Whitby, Malton, Durham, Stockton, Darlington, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne, Whitehaven, etc.  
Returns from corn inspectors from 136 market towns suggest that 
two-fifths of these towns were selling wheat on the basis of their density 
in 1834.61 Comparing the same 136 towns in 1878 suggests that the 
number of market towns selling grain on this basis had increased to more 
than half during the nineteenth-century.62 Of the top twenty towns 
accounting for about 60% of the corn sold in domestic markets in 1880, 
eleven markets were reported to be using natural weight measurements 
as a basis for wheat sales. These included towns such as Norwich (10%), 
London (4%), Boston (3.5%) and Northampton (3%).63 
The use of density measures to assess the quality of wheat was 
not unique to Britain. French bakers regularly used this method to 
distinguish between a setier of good wheat and average quality wheat. 
Although the ‘artful and meticulous bakers’ could assess quality of grain 
through sensory examination, by itself this was not considered to be a 
                                                     
59 PP 1834 Vol. XLIX. p. 262 
60 PP 1834 Vol. XLIX. Letter by John Bartlett, Aug 27, 1833. 
61 PP 1834 Vol. XLIX, p. 256; in addition more than half the towns reported that the 
basis for selling corn was by volume-only measurements, and the rest of the towns 
using weight-only measurements. 
62 PP 1878-79 Vol. LXV, Memorandum by comptroller of corn returns. PP 1878-79 Vol. 
LXV, Summary of returns by corn inspectors. 
63 PP 1881 Vol. LXXXIII. Returns showing total quantity for wheat sold in 1880.. The 
figures in parentheses represents the proportion of grain sold in that market town 
compared to the total grain reported as sold for that year.  
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sufficient guarantee of quality; the most reliable test of goodness was 
weight.64 As weight of wheat brought into Paris would vary sharply from 
year to year, a ‘three-quality-range’ had emerged in the mid eighteenth-
century. The setier, the Parisian measure of volume, was equated to 
either 240, 230 or 220 pounds for a normal year, the highest weight 
representing the best quality wheat. In an exceptionally good year, the 
weight of the setier could be set as high as 250 pounds. The three-
quality-range could vary: in 1769, the range was set at 241, 236 and 233 
pounds in Etampes, whereas in Pontoise it was set at 229, 223 and 220 
pounds respectively. 
Density measurements – effectively, a de facto grading system -  
did not capture information about the condition of the grain, such as the 
presence of impurities, dryness or moisture content, texture, etc.. These 
attributes were equally important to the miller and the baker in addition to 
the density of the grain. Historically, information about the condition of the 
grain could be verified through sampling and visual inspection. However, 
even inspecting samples could prove to be problematic. Samples could 
hide the extent of variation in the quality of a given stock. They were also 
liable to damage due to exposure or handling and therefore could not 
represent the actual quality of the entire stock. For example, after selling 
on the basis of samples became common practice in the mid-eighteenth-
century, there were complaints against corn factors that they exposed 
only a selection of their samples so that the buyers did not get a complete 
picture of the actual quality of stock they represented. Similarly, American 
grain inspectors sampling wheat from railway wagons faced similar 
problems in the early twentieth century. Sampling from fully loaded 
wagons, particularly those loaded to the roof, was fraught with difficulties 
                                                     
64 Steven Laurence Kaplan, Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and 
Flour Trade During the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1984), 52-53. 
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in terms of the reliability of the samples extracted. Sampling was also 
problematic in other commodity trades. Cotton sellers in Liverpool often 
accused brokers of carelessly handling samples, which ‘prejudiced the 
sale of the whole lot and often put the seller to the expense of re-
sampling’.65  
The plethora of wheat varieties available in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century could be potentially classified in an incredibly large 
number of ways. Consequently, for the commodity exchanges to develop 
detailed mechanisms for measuring and grading these complex goods 
involved selecting a finite set of attributes, or ‘summary criteria’, such that 
the commodity could be graded into a manageable number of classes. 
Criteria used to determine the commercial grade of grain from the 
samples submitted for inspection included moisture content, density, 
freedom from foreign material (cleanliness), condition and texture of the 
kernels, etc.66 Grain traders had previously adopted a distinct vocabulary 
to describe quality characteristics. This included several terms such as 
sound, bright, common, extra, choice, merchantable, clean, fair, hot, 
unsound, sweet, musty, etc.67 Many of these terms were used to describe 
the grades that the commodity exchanges developed.  
The commodity exchanges usually depended upon two methods to 
grade quality: certificate final, and fair average quality (FAQ).68 Certificate 
final referred to grades that were certified by an authority in the 
originating country, such as the CBT in the US. These grades functioned 
as classes or standards, ranking the quality of the produce based on 
                                                     
65 Daviron, "Standardization," 169. Lowell D Hill, Grain, Grades and Standards: 
Historical Issues Shaping the Future (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
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67 Hill, Grain, Grades and Standards, 13-14. 
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descriptions of certain attributes, and which British merchants could 
accept as guarantee of quality. In contrast, the FAQ method, most 
commonly adopted in London, involved inspection of samples once the 
produce had reached the UK ports. Under this method, samples of all 
grain imported into UK were periodically collected by LCTA who would 
then arrive at the grades for a given year. The grades were thus 
developed on a responsive basis although the detailed mechanism or 
rules could not be determined from the archival records inspected. The 
FAQ grades were ranked categories into which the different samples 
could be sorted, rather than standards – as in a fixed reference point that 
established conformity or deviation.  
When the LCTA began grading grain on the FAQ basis, the 
description of quality depended upon the source of the produce. For 
instance, when Indian grain was graded on FAQ terms, allowance was 
made for dirt and other impurities (such as non-farinaceous seeds). While 
drawing up the standards for Indian wheat for the 1889 season the East 
India Grain Committee of the LCTA defined the standard for No. 1 Club 
Bombay Wheat as containing 
 
‘[Not over] 3% of impurities of which 1(1/2)% may be dirt for 
shipments to the 30th June, and 3(1/2)% [impurities], of which 
2% may be dirt, for the remainder of the seasons shipments’69 
 
Similarly, standards for New Zealand wheat were made separately 
for round berried and long berried wheat.70  
While making the FAQ grades, the LCTA would take into account 
the differences in the density of the grain from Argentina, Australia, 
California or other locations. For example, while fixing the standard for 
                                                     
69 East India grain committee, London Corn Trade Association (LCTA). Entry for 8th 
Aug 1889. 
70 American and Australian grain committee, LCTA. Entry for 9th April 1891. John 
George Smith, Organised Produce Markets (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 
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Australian wheat in 1894, the LCTA fixed an average weight of 63 lbs per 
bushel for the seasons wheat. On the other hand, the average weight of 
Californian White was assumed to be 60.5 lbs per bushel, while fixing the 
standards for 1895. Similarly, for grain imported from the Black Sea ports, 
the committee had developed rules to account for its density, especially 
for rye and barley.71 In Liverpool, density was used to grade American 
milling wheat specified as spring wheat (weighing 60lbs per bushel), soft 
winter (of 61lbs per bushel) and hard winter (of 60½lbs per bushel). The 
North and South Argentine wheats too were graded according to their 
density at 59½ and 60½lbs per bushel respectively and the Australian 
wheat was specified at 60½lbs per bushel. No wheat weighing more than 
one pound per bushel ‘under basis’ was accepted within these grades.72 
LCTA annually reviewed the FAQ grades and did not use a fixed, 
invariable numerical standard. 
In contrast, the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (CBT) in 1858 
began classifying grades of grain according to fixed descriptions of 
colour, quality and general condition and at the same time certifying to 
those grades.73 Four basic grades for spring wheat, for instance, were 
established: Club wheat, No. 1 Spring, No. 2 Spring, and Rejected. When 
this system of grading attracted opposition, because it lacked uniformity 
and its inspectors had too much discretion, the CBT had to refine these 
grades. In 1859, it added ‘test weight’ i.e. grain density, as a grading 
factor for wheat. The following minimum densities (pounds per bushel) 
were introduced: Club, 60 lbs; No. 1, 56 lbs; Standard, 50 lbs; Rejected, 
40 lbs. These did not always work, as in 1859 when grain less than 45 lbs 
per bushel but of Standard grade or better was delivered. As a result, 
                                                     
71 American and Australian grain committee, LCTA; Sep 24, 1895; Feb 20, 1894, etc. 
Also, Black Sea Grain Committee, LCTA; especially the comparative table for the 
regulation of the ‘natural weight’ of rye. See also, Forrester, "Commodity Exchanges," 
202. 
72  Forrester, "Commodity Exchanges," 204. 
73 Merrill, "Grain Grades," 58. 
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CBT revised the grades and the minimum densities as follows: No. 1, 56 
lbs; Standard, 50 lbs; No. 2, 45 lbs and Rejected, 40 lbs. Even these 
‘standardized’ densities failed to gain the trade’s approval. The CBT 
consequently left the specification of the test weight to the discretion of 
the grain inspectors when ascertaining grade.74 
By the turn of the century, a numerical system of grading the 
various varieties of red, white, winter and spring wheat had emerged. For 
instance, No. 1 white winter wheat was defined as that which was pure 
white, sound, plump and well cleaned. No. 3 was defined as not clean 
and plump enough for No. 2 but which weighed not less than fifty-four 
pounds to the measured bushel. The Board of Railroad and Warehouse 
Commissioners had developed this system of rules for inspection in order 
to ‘establish a proper number and standard of grades for inspection of 
grain’.75 These rules took into account the natural weight of grains such 
as wheat, barley and oats to define certain grades in addition to other 
attributes.  
Nevertheless, the numerical grades in the US were not entirely 
based upon quantitative measurements of quality. Quantification of 
quality attributes continued to remain problematic and elusive. When the 
US Grain Dealers National Association adopted inspection rules in 1908, 
their Grade 1 specified moisture content to be 15%, impurities (dirt, 
broken grains, etc.) to be 1%. Yet in c1914, numerical grades used 
descriptions such as sound, dry, reasonably clean, sweet, mature, plump, 
etc. Studies were conducted by USDA after 1909 to identify ‘tangible 
factors’ influencing the ‘intrinsic value’ of corn. When the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) promulgated official grades for commercial corn in 
1914, six distinct numerical grades were defined on the basis of moisture, 
                                                     
74 Hill, Grain, Grades and Standards, 13-16. 
75 The forty-seventh annual report of the trade and commerce of Chicago. 1905, 
Chicago Board of Trade. Chicago, pp. 30-33. 
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damage to the kernels (due to heat or presence of broken corn, etc.) and 
presence of foreign material.76  
The LCTA and US (primarily the CBT) grades were fundamentally 
different. The FAQ method that the LCTA used effectively produced 
ranked categories, the description of which depended upon the season’s 
produce. The description of the wheat grain’s quality thus tended to 
change according to the season, the year and the actual cargoes of grain. 
This was very different from the grading systems that emerged in the US, 
pioneered by the CBT in Illinois and gradually emulated by other wheat 
growing states. The US grades were intended to be fixed standards, with 
descriptions of grain attributes that were unvarying. On the basis of such 
standards, the grain inspectors could issue ‘official certificate of 
inspection’, which guaranteed the quality of a particular cargo. 
For a long time, London (UK) buyers resisted and challenged the 
practice of US exporters to dispatch American wheat on the basis that 
inspection certificates were ‘final as to quality.’ A major objection was that 
inspection prior to shipment did not account for dissipation of quality due 
to moisture and poor storage conditions during shipment. Indeed, this 
was a major problem with transatlantic imports into the UK in particular, 
and European ports in general.77 Consequently, the LCTA would inspect 
and confirm US wheat grade quality, along with imports of wheat from 
other foreign sources. Californian wheat, which was not imported along 
with inspection certificates, was naturally graded by the LCTA. This 
practice was still common by the 1890s. Eventually, in 1898 the London 
and Liverpool associations decided to accept the inspection certificates to 
be ‘final as to quality and inserted clauses to that effect in the standard 
                                                     
76 Hill, Grain, Grades and Standards, 18-19 & 71-76. Refer table 3 comparing grades 
specified by USDA and those used in three major grain markets of New York, Chicago 
and Minneapolis 
77 Merrill, "Grain Grades," 65-66. Merrill was the President of the CBT at the time he 
wrote this article. Hill pp. 25-7 Rothstein 1988, p. 107 
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American Cargo and Parcel Forms used by the LCTA members.78 This 
acceptance was the result of continuing negotiations between the LCTA 
and the US commodity exchanges, culminating with the proposed 
involvement of the USDA. The ‘moisture content certificates’ that were 
issued also helped to make the inspection certificates acceptable to the 
UK and European buyers.  
The elimination of differences in the product standards within the 
commodity chain thus involved the acceptance of US quality grades in 
the UK. Further, the acceptance of LCTA grades for wheat imported from 
other sources (forming nearly half of total UK imports) was also crucial in 
the standardisation process. No single criteria or uniform set of attributes 
was used to grade all imported wheat. The ‘summary criteria’ differed 
according to the trade route and sources of wheat. The centralising 
authority of the LCTA and the governance structures it developed were 
crucial in coordinating the vastly increased trade volumes and the greater 
heterogeneity of wheat varieties reaching UK markets by the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
 
IV 
While important changes were occurring on the supply side there 
were corresponding and equally significant changes in the milling 
industry. Being the largest buyers of wheat, these changes cannot be 
merely coincidental and were intimately connected.  
 
 
 
                                                     
78 American and Australian grain committee, LCTA. Entry for 1st Jan 1891. Also, see 
Arbitration Subcommittee, LCTA, for suggested alteration of Contract Forms 1898 
proposed by the Liverpool Corn Trade Association on 8th Nov 1897 and accepted by 
committee. 
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Figure 4: 
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The milling technology in use around c1870 had remained 
unchanged for over a hundred years when steam milling had reduced the 
industry’s dependence on wind and water. Millstones continued to be 
used for grinding wheat, the replacement of wooden gear wheels with 
iron ones being the only improvement of note in the intervening period. 
This ‘sudden-death’ grinding method ensured that the wheat grains were 
ground thoroughly and as quickly as possible. The consequence of this 
method was that the flour obtained contained a significant proportion of 
bran, although the extraction rate of flour from the wheat grain was about 
80%. New developments in milling technology, particularly in Hungary 
and the US, involved improvement and perfection of roller milling 
techniques. Rolling produced whiter flour although the extraction rate 
reduced to about 72% of the wheat grain. The main advantage of this 
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new technology was that it improved the quality and the whiteness of flour 
obtained for the same proportion of grains used to produce the coarse 
‘household’ grade flour using the older grinding technology.79 
The speed and extent of adoption of roller milling was shaped by at 
least three important factors: increasing domestic demand for white flour, 
unsuitability of softer domestic wheat varieties to the technology, and 
increase in the imports of foreign flour and hard wheat varieties. The 
causal links between all these factors is not entirely clear. However, it is 
likely that the increasing demand for white flour had to be satisfied either 
by importing better quality foreign flour or by increasing the domestic 
production of white flour using the new technology. The roller milling 
technology was more effective with the harder wheats, which had been 
edged out of domestic markets when domestic wheat varieties gradually 
shifted towards the softer ‘farmer’s wheat’ of the high yielding varieties.80  
The import of foreign hard wheats after c1860 certainly aided the 
diffusion of the new technology. Imports of milled flour too increased 
during this period. Within a decade from 1875, the quantum of flour 
imports had nearly trebled, and most of it was sourced from the US 
(figure 4). The imported flour constituted nearly a fifth of the national 
consumption by the end of the 1880s, almost double compared to the 
previous decade. The take-up of roller milling technology was slow and 
uneven. Also, there was a polarization of the industry into a few large 
firms, serving regional and national markets, and hundreds of small 
country mills serving mainly local demand. The small firms formed about 
95 percent of the mills in the UK in the late 1880s, but produced about 35 
                                                     
79 Richard Perren, "Structural Change and Market Growth in the Food Industry: Flour 
Milling in Britain, Europe and America, 1850-1914," The Economic History Review 43, 
no. 3 (1990): 423-424. Jennifer Tann and Glyn Jones, "Technology and 
Transformation: The Diffusion of the Roller Mill in the British Flour Milling Industry, 
1870-1907," Technology and Culture 37, no. 1 (1996): 41-43. Glyn Jones, The Millers: 
A Story of Technological Endeavour and Industrial Success, 1870-2001 (Lancaster: 
Carnegie Publishing Limited, 2001), 22-25.  
80 Tann and Jones, "Flour Milling." Perren, "Flour Milling." Walton, "British Cereals." 
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percent of the domestic flour. By 1910, five of the largest roller milling 
firms (from a total of more than 800 firms) accounted for about one-fifth of 
the total output; this concentration would later increase to nearly two-
thirds by 1930. The large firms were concentrated around the major port 
areas, which were both a source of raw materials as well as demand, and 
were characterized by significantly higher throughput rates due to the 
adoption of roller milling. By the end of the century, the milling industry 
was characterised by increasing competition, concentration and 
specialization, and the small country miller was being gradually 
marginalised.81 
Accordingly, the manner in which grain quality was assessed, the 
attributes of grain that were important for making flour of a given quality, 
and the manner in which they were measured were re-examined and 
refined. ‘The value to the miller of a certain variety of wheat depends 
upon the quantity of fine flour it will yield’, wrote one correspondent in 
1879.82 Millers had traditionally believed that corn of higher density had 
greater bread making qualities. Wheat of lower densities were known to 
yield a lower quality of flour and vice versa. The proportion of albuminoids 
or flesh formers was thought to determine the quality or fineness of flour. 
It was found to increase as the density of grain increased, and was one of 
the principal reasons why denser grains were considered to have better 
bread making ability. ‘More flour is produced from corn of higher specific 
gravity, and more bread from such flour, than from inferior corn or inferior 
flour’, a report from 1834 had claimed.83 Although lighter, coarser grains 
could yield a larger proportion of flour, this was achieved by including 
coarse bran and thereby reducing the quality of flour obtained.84 
                                                     
81 Perren, "Flour Milling." Tann and Jones, "Flour Milling," 62-66. 
82 Miller, May 5, 1879, Technical Issue, p. 193. 
83 PP 1834 Vol. VII. London. 
84 Miller, May 5, 1879, Technical Issue, p. 193; Nov. 3, 1879, p. 682. 
 41
   
Generally, the millers, and bakers, preferred the ‘harder’ wheat varieties 
with high densities to the ‘softer’ wheat varieties with lower densities.85  
But it was not only the density of the grain that was important to the 
miller: the ‘strength’ of the grain or flour was crucial to the miller (and the 
baker) as well. The strength was initially defined as the ability to absorb 
and retain moisture, which later was modified to indicate the quantity and 
quality of gluten the grain contained. Stronger flour was preferred 
because the number of loaves obtained from a given weight of flour were 
more than those obtained from weaker flour. Hard wheat of the low 
yielding (and conversely high density variety) were considered to be 
stronger wheats, whereas softer wheats were considered to be of the 
weaker kind. British wheats, on the whole, were considered to be of the 
weaker kind. The miller basically had to balance both the density as well 
as moisture characteristics of the grain, as those varieties with the 
highest-bushel weight with low moisture content usually gave the greatest 
amount of flour.86 
Before the introduction of the rolling mills, when wheat was ground 
between millstones, the colour of the grain was also important to the 
miller, as invariably some of the bran or coat of the grain was also ground 
along with the fleshy part. Flour from red-grained wheats was never as 
white as that obtained from white-skinned wheats; white flour 
commanded a higher price in the market. In any case, white wheat was 
known to yield a slightly higher proportion of flour than red wheats. This 
difference in the colour of wheat became less important once the roller 
system of milling was adopted after c1880, as with this new technology 
very little of the bran was mixed with the rest of the flour and flour from 
red-grained wheat could be as white as that from white-skinned wheat.87 
                                                     
85 Walton, "British Cereals," 39-40. 
86 John Percival, Wheat in Great Britain (Reading: 1934). Jago and Jago, 
Breadmaking. Jones, Millers. 
87 Percival, Wheat, 72. 
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As the milling process became more specialized and sophisticated, 
the differences in quality between varieties as well as the consistency of 
quality in a given variety became crucially important. Measuring quality 
was necessary to achieve the desired quality of flour, and to enable the 
millers to remain profitable. Throughout most of the nineteenth-century 
millers continued to rely upon the visual inspection of samples to 
purchase grain, testing for density, colour, texture, and the extent of 
cleanliness. Millers purchasing domestic grain continued to do so, 
although the importance of domestic wheat had diminished by the 
twentieth century; only about 19 percent of home grown wheat was used 
for bread making by 1914, down from 60 percent in c1860.88 As the 
volume of imported grain increased and the number of varieties available 
multiplied, the millers began to rely upon the grades and standards set by 
the various commodity associations, such as the LCTA or the Liverpool 
Corn Trade Association.  
Notwithstanding this shifting reliance on grades, assessing the 
quality of grain still depended upon the ‘empiricism of the practical 
miller’.89 This became evident during the process of mixing grains into a 
‘grist’, i.e. flour that British bakers would accept. Millers had to consider, 
for each variety of wheat, whether it would contribute to one or more 
aspect of flour quality: strength, colour, taste or general appearance. 
Thus, one miller described an ‘ideal’ grist composed of 20 bolls each of 
No. 1 American, Canada Club, Saxonska, Californian or Oregon and 
British wheats (each boll being equivalent to 240lbs). These 100 bolls, 
according to this miller, could yield 60 sacks of fine flour, an additional 5 
sacks of ‘overheads’ (a lower grade of flour), 15 cwt of ‘feeding’ seconds, 
and about 30 cwt of bran. The gross margin in this case was estimated to 
be about £12 and 5s. In response to this, another miller claimed that, 
                                                     
88 Perren, "Flour Milling," 425. Refer table 1. Jones, Millers, 59. Percival, Wheat, 71. 
89 Jones, Millers, 61. 
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using a different configuration of machinery, for the same grist 
combination, he could obtain 23 sacks of ‘new process’ flour, 44 sacks of 
first grade flour, 8 cwt of ‘thirds’ and 32.5 cwt of bran at a gross margin of 
£22 and 18s.90  
When another miller invited comment on whether his mixture (3 
sacks red winter; 2 sacks Michigan; 2 sacks No. 2 spring and 5 sacks of 
English white) ‘ought to make a good sack of bakers flour’, he received at 
least five different suggestions from other millers.91 One correspondent 
suggested that the proportion of English wheat was too high and instead 
recommended that 3 sacks of Michigan be used instead of 2, and that 
English white be limited to 2 sacks. Another correspondent suggested the 
original mixture would result in ‘lack of strength and colour’ and 
suggested eliminating English white altogether and adding an extra sack 
of No. 2 spring to the mixture: alternatively, the red winter, No. 2 spring 
and the English white could be mixed in equal proportions. A third 
correspondent suggested leaving the English white out altogether, 
grinding the remaining mixture separately, and then letting the meal sit in 
the sack for a few days before mixing. The fourth correspondent 
suggested that if this was milled in the country then 6 parts each of No. 1 
American spring with ‘sound’ new English white wheat, mixed well in a bin 
a week before grinding, could give the desired results. The fifth 
correspondent recommended one sack each of Dantzic and American 
spring, three sacks each of American white and American winter and four 
sacks of English white (part new and part old).92  
The importance of grain quality in the grist was underscored by the 
economics of flour extraction that created a direct volumetric relationship 
between grain inputs and flour output. Consider this example from more 
                                                     
90 Miller, Letters on ‘Milling Reform’, Apr 1 and May 6, 1878. 
91 Miller, Feb 2, 1880, Letter no. 669, p. 922. 
92 Miller, Letters: reply to 669, Mar 1, 1880, p. 45-46; Apr 5, 1880, p. 119.  
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recent times. In 1973, the Chicago (CBT) grade number 2 soft red winter 
wheat (SRW) specified 58 lbs per bushel density as a grading criteria. If 
the miller assumes a 73% flour extraction rate, this implies that 2.36 
bushels would be required to produce 100 lbs of flour. A reduction of 
density from 58 lbs to 57 lbs per bushel has two implications. First, at the 
same extraction rate, the miller now needs 2.40 bushels of wheat to 
produce 100 lbs of flour. Second, a reduction of test weight, and hence 
quality of the grain, is likely accompanied by a reduction of extraction rate 
to say 70% which further increases the quantity of grain required, 2.50 
bushels, to produce the same quantity of flour. The resulting cost 
differential of wheat to flour is not always reflected in the price discounts 
for the different wheat qualities.93 
Of course, to the British miller in the late nineteenth-century it was 
not only the price of individual variety of wheat that was of ultimate 
importance, but the relative costs differentials between the individual 
varieties due to the mixing of grains for the grist. The miller had to 
balance his margins according to the price of bread and the price of 
wheat. Comparing the price of flour to the price of bread and wheat over 
a 52-week period between 1894 and 1895, we see the degree to which 
the millers had to manage this balancing act. Figure 5 compares the price 
of wheat to flour assuming that the following mixture of grains is used to 
make the grist: 30% each of No. 1 Spring American and Fine Russian 
and 20% each of Red Winter and Fine English. Moreover, millers were 
often forced by competition to sell flour at less than its value as compared 
to wheat or to the corresponding quality of the flour to make its price 
remunerative.94 
 
                                                     
93 Eluned Jones, "The Role of Information in Us Grain and Oilseed Markets," Review of 
Agricultural Economics 21, no. 1 (1999): 250-251. 
94 J Kirkland, "The Relative Prices of Wheat and Bread," The Economic Journal 6, no. 
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Figure 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on price data reported for 52 weeks between Mar 1894 and Feb 
1895 in Kirkland, "Bread prices," 481-82 
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By the last quarter of the nineteenth-century, techniques for 
assessing the quality of wheat were still fairly uncertain. One expert wrote 
in 1890 that ‘it will be well for mixing purposes to consider wheat as 
coming under one of three heads – strong, coloury or neutral (sic)’.95 He 
further pointed out that wheat buying was governed by experience, 
general principles and by what varieties of wheat happened to be 
available in supply. After 1880, changes in milling technology were 
accompanied by development and improvements in testing and 
measuring the different quality attributes. The increased understanding of 
the chemical composition and properties of gluten, the substance in grain 
that lends strength to the flour, aided these developments. Various testing 
                                                     
95 W R Voller, Modern flour milling, Gloucester, 1889, as cited in Jones, Millers, 59.   
 46
   
methods and instruments were made available for assessing the quality 
of flour: Pekar’s method of assessing whiteness of flour, Boland’s 
aleurometer to test the strength of gluten, and Robine’s method for 
estimating quantity and likely bread output are some examples.96 Even 
so, each miller had to discover for himself the strength of any given flour, 
as there was ‘no satisfactory method of numerically registering strength 
except through a baking test’.97 Even so, final assessment and testing 
remained the miller’s responsibility; they had to rely upon baking tests 
and other measurements to ascertain quality ex post. 
Although the milling industry developed more sophisticated ways of 
assessing the wheat quality, towards the end of the nineteenth-century, 
milling itself remained an acquired skill based upon experience and 
experimentation; for instance, many millers could not agree on what 
constituted an ‘ideal’ grist. Wheat buying was governed by experience, 
general principles and a considerable degree of detailed knowledge, even 
by the end of the nineteenth-century. Nevertheless, the correspondence 
between millers indicates a shifting trend away from visual inspection as 
they sought to capture the grain composition in more explicit terms of 
gluten and protein content. We discern a gradual acceptance of the 
grading and standards developed by the various commodity associations 
as British millers began to rely upon the grades established by LCTA. 
This was an iterative process with the grading of quality helping the 
milling industry to become more professional, which in turn, and in 
conjunction with other changes in the industry, required further refinement 
of the quality grades themselves. The industry thus played an important 
role in the standardization of ex ante assessment and guaranteeing of 
wheat quality.  
                                                     
96  Jones, Millers, 59-61.; Grain chemists continue to use some of these quality tests to 
this day (see www.aaccnet.org).  
97 Jago and Jago, Breadmaking, 291. Also, Jones, Millers, 60-61. 
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V 
What does the analysis of the wheat-grain commodity chain reveal 
about ‘deep integration’ in the international grain markets of the 
nineteenth century? The answer to this question is considered on the 
basis of three important issues revealed by the analysis: the institutional 
changes necessary to eliminate product differences, the endogeneity of 
such changes, and the manner in which institutions and standards helped 
to reduce transaction costs. The commodity chain analysis suggests that 
coordination in the international wheat markets occurred at multiple levels 
(firms and committees) and in several different ways (integration, co-
specialisation, governance structures, voluntary consensus, regulation, 
etc.). The analysis also demonstrates that standardisation, upon which 
fungibility and coordination was dependant, was a long and involved 
process spanning nearly the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Moreover, it shows that firms and markets were able to capture the 
externalities of lowered transaction costs as a result of increased 
coordination, standardisation, and governance structures. Thus, the 
formation of a global value chain can be considered as undeniable 
evidence of ‘deep’ market integration. 
The analysis shows how this particular ‘trader driven’ commodity 
chain was characterised by loose networks of trading firms linked with a 
professional downstream industrial firms (the millers). The chain was also 
characterised by the broader institutional framework of organised 
commodity exchanges and industry associations. This was an ‘extra’ 
layer of coordination over the trade networks – a type of shared collective 
institutional arrangement – that enabled the traders to reduce costs and 
risks, which in turn ensured the reliability of supply, and increased sales.  
Several international grain traders (such as the Ralli brothers) 
transformed into multinational trading firms, through investments in 
producer countries (US, South America, India, etc.) and the integration of 
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exporting, shipping and importing functions.98 Such strategies ensured 
that the traders could secure continuous supplies, manage and spread 
risks, maintain effective communications, and reduce transaction costs. 
Nevertheless, both international traders and domestic merchants 
organised themselves into trade associations and exchanges, both in 
producer as well as importing nations. The CBT was formed in the US 
during the late 1840s as a voluntary association of traders and began 
defining wheat grades as early as 1856.99 In the UK, the LCTA was 
formally constituted in 1878, although its origins lie in the much older 
Baltic Exchange founded in the mid-eighteenth century. This institution 
had its origins in the Virginia and Baltick Coffee House of Threadneedle 
Street in London, a place where merchants involved in the international 
trade would meet. The members included importing merchants, foreign 
merchants, shippers and prominent millers. In the auction room of the 
Baltic Exchange, oil and tallow were offered for sale initially, and after the 
repeal of the corn laws, wheat and other grain were auctioned. It became 
the headquarters of the London Corn Trade Association (LCTA) once it 
emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and practically all London grain 
dealers were members of both the Baltic Exchange as well as the 
LCTA.100  
Non-trading groups within this chain also exhibit similar institutional 
frameworks. The British millers set up several industry associations after 
c1870, which at first sought to regulate the conditions for sale of flour, but 
later became a forum to establish procedures and governance 
mechanisms, and to serve as nodes to disseminate knowledge and 
information. Regional associations included the Sheffield Association 
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(founded 1873), the London Association (founded 1878), Liverpool and 
Manchester District Association (active c1878), etc.101 However, the 
association that undoubtedly had the greatest impact on the industry was 
the National Association of British and Irish Millers (NABIM) formed in 
1878.  
NAIBM received strong support from millers in London, Liverpool, 
Sheffield, Leeds, the Bristol Channel and South Wales area, 
Northamptonshire, and other locations where large milling firms were 
established; in-country and small milling firms failed initially to see the 
benefit of this association.102 The association acted as a ‘pressure or 
lobby group’ on behalf of its members, and the British milling and wheat 
marketing trades more generally. It could canvass the views of regional 
and local millers associations, corn merchants and agriculturists and 
lobby state departments (e.g. The Board of Trade) or merchant 
associations (e.g. LCTA).103   
Above all, the association functioned as a ‘clearing house’ for 
knowledge and information. For instance, a series of annual conventions 
were organized by NABIM between 1884 and 1890 on topics such as 
‘Bookkeeping for millers’, ‘Gradual reduction milling’, ‘The Carter and 
Zimmer sorting system’, ‘The world’s wheat crop and wheat values’, etc. It 
also acted as the ‘educator’ and a promoter of milling as a ‘science’ 
beyond its obvious industrial origins. The association, and the individuals 
associated with it such as William Voller and William Dunham, provided 
the general structure and supervision of technical education and 
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complemented the various efforts that were underway to establish some 
sort of organizational structure for technical education in general.104  
There is thus strong evidence that the coordinating layer of a 
broader institutional framework existed or emerged sometime during the 
nineteenth century along a developing global commodity chain. Almost 
certainly it enabled a more efficient structure to share information and 
knowledge by complementing the structures of the trading networks. The 
crucial point is that the information and governing structures in the 
institutional frameworks emerged endogenously through voluntary 
consensus. This is neatly exhibited in the analysis of the quality 
conventions and standardisation in the global wheat-grain commodity 
chain. 
The fundamental measurement problem, discussed previously, 
implied that standardisation of wheat-grain quality had to be achieved on 
the basis of common or summary criteria. With the increasing 
internationalisation, and a proliferation of sources and varieties, the key 
information issue the measurement problem raised was which set of 
attributes should form the summary criteria. As the analysis of the 
standardisation process has shown, the solution involved the adoption of 
multiple attribute sets: a universal set of attributes did not emerge. This 
observation conforms to the view that quality is a relative rather than an 
absolute concept.105 Not only did the summary criteria differ according to 
the source, and by implication the variety of the grain, but the millers used 
different criteria to judge grain quality compared to the traders. Thus, the 
standardisation of attribute sets depended upon who was conducting the 
measurements. The fact that finite sets of attributes had to be agreed 
upon, and that quality measurements according to multiple such sets had 
                                                     
104 Jones, Millers, 148-156. Voller was one of the pioneers of technical education; 
Dunham was the founder of the trade journal Miller (London). 
105 Peter Bowbrick, The Economics of Quality, Grades and Brands (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p.2-11. 
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to coordinate the movement of the commodity along multiple trade routes 
implies that the standardisation process was institutionally, rather than 
technologically driven. In other words, it was endogenous to the value 
chain. 
For example, Pirrong has argued that the differences in the storage 
and distribution methods in the US compared to other producer nations 
determined why wheat from US was graded at source compared to wheat 
imported from other locations, which was graded in the UK.106 The 
elevator-based storage system that developed in America in the latter half 
of the nineteenth-century enabled formal grading, and in fact required it. 
The grains were graded at the point when the farmer brought it for 
storage at the shipping point. The elevator agent upon examining the 
quality of the grain settled with the farmer both the grade of the grain and 
its value. This grain was stored in the elevator along with grain of similar 
quality, thus segregating the identity of the grain parcels from that of the 
individual sellers. The seller (farmer) received value according to the 
lowest quality that the grain could be graded into. This strengthened the 
incentives of those shipping the grain to elevators to maintain quality 
before storage.107 Once the graded grain was loaded onto ships or 
railway cars for transport it was nearly impossible to mix grain of varying 
qualities. Such opportunism problems and malpractices were possible 
prior to storage. The only dissipation of quality could occur due to 
damage caused by moisture and poor storage conditions. The incentives 
to maintain quality prior to shipment was high, but not during the 
transportation of the already graded grain. This problem was alleviated 
eventually when moisture content certificates began to be issued, which 
                                                     
106 Pirrong, "Commodity Exchanges." 
107 James Stewart, "Marketing Wheat," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 107 (1923): 187-188. 
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could then be used to compare with the actual condition of the grain when 
it arrived at its destination.108 
In contrast, handling facilities for grain imported from other 
countries such as Argentina and Australia were extremely crude. Crude 
handling methods exposed the grain to varying weather and insect 
condition and the absence of elevators meant that it was most efficient to 
ship grain in bags. This made it virtually impossible to create parcels of 
grain of standardized grades by combining grain from individual growers 
prior to shipment, as was possible in the elevator based storages of North 
America. Further, with individual shipments retaining their identity, 
inspecting quality at the importing country economized on the number of 
measurements necessary along such a trade route. There were few 
incentives to prevent dissipation of quality prior to bagging and storage. 
But all things being equal, this system would have given the shipper an 
incentive to take care of the cargo at sea.109 In such practices, quality 
could not be guaranteed prior to shipment. The FAQ system, an ex-post 
method of grading, was particularly suited in these instances. It adjusted 
standards to reflect systematic factors affecting the quality of grain from a 
particular location (level of quality due to grain composition as well as 
condition due to storage, transport, handling, etc.), and made fewer 
quality distinctions between different shipments. The method minimized 
the number of potential disputes regarding product quality. Thus, the 
institutions developed different grading methods using different summary 
criteria to measure quality and standardisation in this case did not imply 
rationalisation of grading methods.  
Importantly, the institutional processes were largely driven through 
voluntary consensus. As the growing literature on voluntary consensus 
                                                     
108 Merrill, "Grain Grades," 66. 
109 This would also have depended upon the contract and shipping terms, i.e. who had 
the residual property rights on the cargo and who paid for insurance, freight, etc. 
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standards argues, this approach to standards setting – i.e. standards 
setting through committees – is particularly useful in understanding how 
standards, that are neither de facto (i.e. ex-ante) nor de jure (i.e. 
mandatory), emerge. The centralising influence of the commodity 
exchanges is clearly evident in the quality grades they developed – they 
were certainly not de facto standards. And yet, in the nineteenth century, 
such quality grades did not have the power of legislation enforcing their 
adoption in the international markets. Adoption of these standards was 
purely voluntary. That they were universally adopted by the trading 
community reinforces its consensual nature: of course, internal 
governance structures (e.g. standardised contract forms) ensured large-
scale adoption.  
The manner in which the standardisation process played out in this 
commodity chain has two major implications. First, the process itself was 
a long drawn-out one, spanning nearly the entire second half of the 
nineteenth century. While, the formal grading of wheat grains by 
commodity exchanges developed independently in the US and the UK, 
the adoption of US grades in the UK was not straightforward. Although 
CBT graded wheat began arriving in the UK from the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century, it was not until the twilight years of that century that 
the US grades were considered to be ‘final as to quality.’ Standardisation, 
in terms of elimination of product differences, for non-trading buyers in the 
UK, i.e. the millers was somewhat more elusive. Institutions such as trade 
journals and technical institutes, along with advances in the 
understanding of grain chemistry helped to alleviate the issues of non-
standardisation by the end of the nineteenth century. Such endogenous 
institutional changes clearly indicate a strong element of path 
dependency. 
The second implication of the standardisation process was that 
fungibility was an institutional construct rather than a technical attribute of 
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the commodity. To contemporary neo-classical economists, such as 
Marshall, the extent to which a commodity could be traded depended 
upon the ability to describe it completely and in known terms. Thus, 
international division of labour assumed, indeed required, product 
fungibility, which in turn determined the extent of the market. Fungibility 
was previously held to be a technical attribute and was costless to 
achieve. However, the analysis of the wheat grades shows that its 
fungibility depended upon its alienation (from the producer’s identity), 
rather than its homogeneity – that is, a high degree of sameness of the 
produce. The grading of wheat grains by the commodity exchanges 
greatly aided the alienation by de-linking residual rights in the commodity 
from its physical possession or origin. Tradability no longer depended 
upon the ability to deliver the physical product. Futures trading in the 
commodity in fact developed on the basis of such alienation. The 
instruments so traded did not have to account for the vagaries of the 
physical cargo (to a large extent) or at least shifted the immediate risk of 
quality dissipation. In fact, this may have enhanced the incentives to 
preserve the quality of the physical cargo according to the grain’s original 
grade. It mattered less, for futures trading, that US grades were not 
universally accepted by the British trade as ‘final as to quality’ until c1900. 
Similarly, it mattered less that LCTA grades, based on the FAQ method, 
could change slightly from year to year. Any potential increase in the 
measurement and monitoring costs were balanced by the trade’s ability to 
reduce risk by hedging. Either way, fungibility was not a costless process. 
Nor was alienation tied to technical or technological attributes exclusively. 
Fungibility, and tradability was a path-dependent, institutional process.  
Greater, deeper and more explicit cooordination, as well as 
standardisation characterised the emergent commodity value chain. Its 
input-output structure implied that the commodity changed hands several 
times as it went through the various stages of value addition (figure 3b). 
 55
   
These activities increasingly dispersed internationally during the 
nineteenth century, lengthening the value chain along international 
routes. The difference between the late nineteenth century and earlier 
periods of international trade was this: after c1860 wheat was not only 
grown, but also graded and sorted in foreign locations (particularly in 
North America), although it was mixed and milled in the UK. 
The links along this chain (between the various activities) were 
established and strengthened by the various governance structures and 
institutions that emerged during the half-century after c1860. Centralised 
grading by commodity exchanges, ‘official’ quality certificates 
guaranteeing quality, standardised contract terms, arbitration 
mechanisms, emergence of trade journals and rise of technical education, 
improving testing methods, metrological standardisation, etc. are some 
examples of governance structures and institutions that directly 
coordinated exchange along the global chain. ‘Deep’ integration was a 
historical process that international markets experienced as a global 
value chain emerged during the half century following the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown that (deep) integration was a long-term 
historical process that involved substantial changes to the market 
structure, firm strategies, and the nature of the commodity at an 
international level. New forms of coordination, control and governance 
emerged, which have endured throughout the twentieth century. The 
standard contract forms, for instance, that were used by LCTA members 
after c1880 were the genesis of standardised contracts now used by 
GAFTA members (Grain and Feed Trade Association). This international 
association makes available standard trading terms included in a range of 
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over 80 standard contract forms that cover quality (condition, warranties, 
guarantees), shipping documents, payment terms, insurance, testing and 
analysis methods, etc.110  
The implication of enduring changes goes beyond persistent 
contract forms and trading standards. The seeds of the current 
international trading system in grain lay in the manner in which deep 
integration developed during the late nineteenth century. Demonstrably, 
achieving this level of coordination was a costly, tangled and messy 
process. Its effects too were enduring. Deep integration changed the 
social order in the importing countries like the UK in many ways. While 
some groups lost (e.g. landowners and farmers), other groups gained 
(e.g. consumers and millers).111 Grain producing countries – US, 
Argentina, India, Russsia, etc. – too experienced significant changes in 
their respective social orders, and the emergence of new institutions as a 
result of the international elongation of the value chain. What is true of 
grain markets, is also true of other primary commodities (rubber, cocoa, 
cotton, sugar, tea, etc.) as well as manufactured commodities (e.g. 
textiles and apparels).112  
The paper also highlights the role of explicit coordination and 
standardisation in international trade. The implication of multiple levels of 
coordination, within a single value chain, is that coordination is not a 
dimensonless process. The ‘depth’ of coordination somehow tends to be 
collapsed in most stylised models of international trade. The view from 
convention theory – of multiple levels of coordination in economic 
organisation – has important insights for coordination within international 
markets and along long value chains. In the grain markets of the 
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nineteenth century, we not only notice ‘highly filamented upstream 
networks’ combining with downstream firms and industries, we also 
discern coordination between individuals combined with coordination 
within and between ‘committees.’113 Firms that engaged in strategic 
behaviour also cooperate within committees and associations to form 
consensus. Such voluntary consensus forming – to distinguish it from 
cooperation through regulation – was crucial in shaping the institutions 
and governance structures that emerged during this period. The 
standards and grades that emerged as a result of this process were key 
in ensuring the competitiveness of firms, and fungibility and tradability of 
the complex and heterogeneous commodity. The fact that quality 
standards played a strategic role in the competitiveness of firms 
throughout the value chain is evident from the analysis presented here. 
Standards help firms and businesses to overcome basic information 
asymmetries and measurement problems, and generally to capture 
externalities, as has been seen in many other similar historical cases.114 
The global integration of trade accompanying the international 
disintegration of production and consumption centres, as observed by 
Feenstra (1998), were two sides of the same historical coin. 
Nevertheless, integration – in the manner demonstrated in this paper – is 
what made such a disintegration viable in the very long term. The glue 
that held the long value chains together were the institutions and 
governance mechanims that developed largely through endogeneous 
processes. The standards and conventions – technical as well as non-
                                                     
113 Peter Gibbon, "Upgrading Primary Production: A Global Commodity Chain 
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technical ones including commercial terms, and by extention accounting 
practices – were crucial in accommodating the expansion in scope as well 
as scale.  
Finally, the paper highlights the importance of understanding the 
changes to the commodity itself. Like the trade and networks along which 
it flowed, the nature of the commodity too was highly dynamic and 
changed considerably throughout the nineteenth century. Alfred Marshall 
had described in some detail why wheat had become a product that could 
be ‘easily and exactly’ described, and therefore ‘universally 
demanded.’115 However, it took nearly fifty years for the markets to reach 
the level where wheat ‘described’ in the mid-western regions of t
became unequivocally acceptable by the millers in the UK. To reach t
level where this commodity could truly bring down the search c
internationally, solely by being listed on an organised exchange alone, 
required the commodity to change its nature institutionally, not only 
physically.
he US 
he 
osts 
                                                     
116 In fact changes, to wheat, in this tradition continued, for the 
better part of the twentieth century as descriptions continued to be refined 
or altered in the grain producing countries.117 Deep integration was, and 
continues to be, part of long-term historical processes, rather than an 
adjustment with a definite beginning and a finite end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 Marshall, Principles. p. 285 
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